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Cultural Issues and Images in the 
1988 Presidential Campaign: 
Why the Democrats Lost-Again! 
Joel Lieske, Cleveland State University 
The cultural issues and Dukakis not 
responding to them put a wall up between 
Dukakis and voters he could have gotten. 
The wall got so thick that people forgot 
about the economic issues. 
Alan LaPierre, Executive Director 
Alabama Democratic Party 
New York Times, Nov. 10, 1988 
How do you explain the outcomes 
of modern presidential elections? 
This is the central dilemma of Amer- 
ican politics. Why, for instance, did 
the Democrats, the so-called majority 
party, lose again in 1988? And why 
have they gone down to defeat in 
five of the last six presidential elec- 
tions? Curiously, there appears to be 
no dearth of answers to these 
questions. 
Many pundits, such as neocon- 
servative William Schneider (1988), 
have argued that the Democrats are 
too liberal to win a national election. 
Others maintain that presidential 
elections are retrospective referenda 
on the economy and peace issues. 
According to this view, the incum- 
bent party never loses when times are 
prosperous and the nation is at 
peace. Still others argue that presi- 
dential elections are actually beauty 
contests in which voters select the 
candidate who demonstrates the most 
attractive combination of personality 
traits, leadership qualities, and polit- 
ical credentials (Miller, Wattenberg, 
and Malanchuk 1986). Yet others 
contend that most losing Democratic 
candidates have run notoriously inept 
campaigns. In the Yiddish vernacu- 
lar, Dukakis was a "Putz." Finally, 
some analysts (Burns, Peltason, and 
Cronin 1989: 276-77) try to please 
everyone by advancing umbrella ex- 
planations that include all of these 
arguments. 
Unfortunately, none of these ex- 
planations, taken individually, is par- 
ticularly persuasive. And most ap- 
pear to be little more than post hoc 
rationalizations. Of course, when 
something cannot be fully under- 
stood, we are prone to make fun of 
our ignorance. Thus we are enter- 
tained and even amused by the 
tongue-in-cheek interpretations of 
1988 by leading salon commentators 
(Erikson 1989; Sigelman 1989, 
1990). ' But we are still left with the 
uncomfortable feeling that, as a pro- 
fession, we know much less than we 
think. So when we are challenged by 
yet another paradigm, one which 
contends that presidential campaigns 
are media horse races run on video 
and audio sound tracks, and by 
implication, that American voters are 
rootless consumers of political 
"sound bites," it is time to take 
intellectual stock (Joslyn 1984; Orren 
and Polsby 1980). 
My position in this debate is as 
follows. While I agree that the media 
is playing a much greater role in 
presidential elections, I feel that its 
impact has been greatly exaggerated 
by journalistic hype. True, the elec- 
toral environment today is far dif- 
ferent than it was 40 years ago at the 
dawn of television. Americans are 
generally more urbanized, educated, 
mobile, affluent, individualistic, and 
politically sophisticated. Consequent- 
ly, they are also more independent 
than ever before-about one-third 
consider themselves independent- 
and therefore more receptive to the 
campaign appeals of individual can- 
didates. But the medium only com- 
municates the message. It is not the 
message itself. 
In order to understand the growing 
role of the media and the changing 
character of presidential campaign 
politics, it is my thesis that political 
scientists must first understand the 
cultural realities of American politics 
and the kinds of issues that concern 
most voters. Thus I will argue that 
modern presidential elections are 
being increasingly decided, not by the 
socioeconomic issues traditionally 
emphasized by liberal Democrats, but 
by a new set of cultural issues, first 
identified by Richard Scammon and 
Ben Wattenberg in The Real Major- 
ity. It is my contention that Bush 
won in 1988 because he was more 
successful in appealing to the cultural 
preferences (issues) and stereotypes 
(images) of those groups who consti- 
tute the real, cultural majority in 
American politics. 
My case rests on the following 
contentions: 
(1) That the United States is a 
diverse, multicultural society com- 
posed of competing racial, ethnic, 
religious, and regional subcultures. 
This is a political axiom that many 
liberal Democrats seem to accept in 
theory but reject in practice. On the 
one hand, America's cultural plural- 
ism is not denied. But on the other, 
it is often claimed that the nation's 
racial, ethnic, religious, and regional 
divisions are not that important now, 
are waning over time, and will ulti- 
mately become insignificant (Erikson, 
Luttbeg, and Tedin 1989). Yet, there 
is a growing mass of evidence which 
suggests that ethnocultural dif- 
ferences in American society are still 
persistent and consequential. And 
rather than decreasing, they may 
actually be on the rise. This evidence 
includes recent census data on the 
racial and ethnic identifications of 
Americans, survey data on church 
membership, subcultural studies of 
American government and politics, 
and cultural explanations of Ameri- 
can political behavior. 
As Leege, Lieske, and Wald (1989: 
31) have observed, "Racial and eth- 
nic diversity-and the group con- 
sciousness that accompanies them- 
have accelerated rapidly in recent 
years."2 In 1960, they point out, the 
United States was 88.6% white, 
10.5% black, and less than 1%o 
Asian and other. By 1985, they note, 
the predominant group, white 
Anglos, had dropped in population 
share by 10%0 while blacks increased 
to 12%. Hispanics constituted 
another 7% while Asians and others 
grew to 2.7%. Based on census pro- 
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jections, they note that by the year 
2000, whites will constitute less than 
74% of the population; while blacks, 
Hispanics, and Asians will comprise 
another 13%, 9%, and 4%, respec- 
tively. 
But race is not the only cultural 
cleavage that divides Americans. In 
1980, the U.S. census also included a 
question on ethnic ancestry: "In 
addition to being American, what do 
you consider your main ethnic group 
or nationality group?" Based on 
responses to this question, over 118 
million Americans (52.3%) classified 
themselves into a single ancestry 
group; some 69 million more 
(30.8%) designated a multiple ances- 
try group. Thus, of the 226 million 
Americans surveyed in the 1980 cen- 
sus, a surprising 83.1% identified 
with a nationality other than 
American. 
Though they are declining as a 
proportion of the population, the 
two dominant ethnic groups in 
American politics are those who 
claim British (22.4%) and German 
(22.3%) ancestry. Along with Ameri- 
cans of Scandinavian (1.1 ) ances- 
try, these so-called "mainline" 
groups constitute a cultural plurality, 
if not political majority, in American 
politics. 3 Historically, these groups 
were among the "first effective set- 
tlers" in most states and regions of 
the country (Gastil 1975). In addi- 
tion, they share a common Germanic 
tongue and cultural tradition in the 
family of Indo-European languages. 
And they also share common re- 
ligious traditions in the Protestant 
wing of Christianity. 
Moreover, contrary to the secular 
claims of some sociologists and 
futurists, religion and religious diver- 
sity continue to play a vital role in 
the life of the nation. Relative to 
other advanced industrial democra- 
cies, the United States stands out in 
the high proportion (58 percent ver- 
sus middle teens to middle thirties 
for other countries) of its citizens 
who say that religion is still "very 
important" to them (Erikson, Lutt- 
beg, and Tedin 1988). It also stands 
out in the high proportion of Ameri- 
cans who claim church membership 
(51 percent) and the large and grow- 
ing number of church denominations 
(some 111) to which they belong 
(Wald 1987; Glenmary Research 
Center 1982). 
Along with economic divisions, 
these cultural divisions have become 
intertwined with other dimensions of 
social stratification, producing what 
Leege et al. (1989: 34) describe as an 
"increasing segmentation of the 
American population by life-style 
choices." As a growing number of 
scholars have documented, this seg- 
mentation is observable in the racial, 
ethnic, and social segregation of resi- 
dential neighborhoods (Weiss 1988: 
xii; Robbins 1989), ethnocultural 
conflicts within the American states 
(Peirce and Hagstrom 1984), and the 
division of the U.S. into identifiable 
political subcultures and cultural 
regions (Elazar 1970; Gastil 1975; 
Garreau 1981). 
Finally, historical studies of the 
American electorate suggest that par- 
tisan divisions and voting behavior 
are best understood in terms of the 
political preferences of subcultural 
groups operating within different 
regions and locales (Kleppner 1970; 
Kelley 1979). And rather than dis- 
appearing, subcultural differences are 
still crucial in understanding current 
party loyalties and voting in recent 
presidential elections (Lieske 1988a, 
1988b). Moreover, their effects ap- 
pear to be independent of socio- 
economic differences and regionally 
specific. Using aggregate data for all 
3,164 U.S. counties and a rigorous 
test for compositional effects, I have 
shown that there are significant sub- 
cultural differences in the 1980 U.S. 
presidential vote, and that the factors 
which shape the vote differ from one 
region of the country to the next 
(Lieske 1989). These factors include 
differences in racial origin, ethnic 
ancestry, religious affiliation, social 
life-style, and political partisanship. 
Consistent with cultural theory, I 
have shown that these factors can 
also predict the candidate preferences 
of individual voters in the 1988 presi- 
dential election. 
(2) That the Democratic New Deal 
Coalition is now sharply divided on 
most domestic policy issues including 
a new set of racial and cultural life- 
style issues. 
Forged by Franklin Roosevelt, the 
New Deal Coalition united white 
southerners, northern white ethnics, 
labor, liberals, and racial minorities 
around common economic interests 
following the Great Depression. In 
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recent presidential elections, how- 
ever, these groups have become 
increasingly divided not only over 
longstanding social welfare issues 
that formerly united them but also 
over a new set of racial (commonly 
labeled as civil rights) and cultural 
life-style issues. The new issues in- 
clude special federal aid programs 
for racial minorities, affirmative 
action, busing, drug abuse, urban 
crime, bilingual education, illegal 
immigration, capital punishment, 
school prayer, abortion, homosexual 
rights, and gun control. Though few 
are explicitly racial, ethnic, or 
religious, most have racial, ethnic, 
and religious overtones. 
These new issues have emerged, in 
part, because of growing racial- 
ethnic, religious, and subcultural 
divisions in the American electorate; 
partly because of the declining im- 
portance of the social welfare and 
foreign policy issues in American 
politics;4 and partly because of 
cultural and life-style changes that 
have occurred in American society 
during the past quarter century. The 
social welfare issues, of course, were 
key to partisan divisions during the 
1930s and early 1940s following the 
Great Depression. Foreign policy 
issues gained importance during the 
Cold War, circa the late 1940s and 
the 1950s. The civil rights issues 
came into prominence during the 
struggle for black equality around 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. And 
the cultural issues have steadily 
gained political saliency since the late 
1960s. 
Since Dukakis's liberalism became 
a major issue in the 1988 campaign, 
it is important to understand what 
the terms "liberal" and "conserva- 
tive" mean today within the context 
of these different issue domains. On 
social welfare issues, a liberal is 
someone who favors more govern- 
ment intervention in the economy; a 
conservative favors less. On foreign 
policy, a liberal is someone who 
believes in the "limits" of military 
power and favors bilateral and multi- 
lateral peace negotiations; a conser- 
vative is someone who emphasizes 
the "moral" obligations of military 
intervention to "keep the peace" and 
favors a policy of "peace through 
strength." On civil rights issues, a 
liberal is someone who favors federal 
action on behalf of racial minorities; 
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a conservative favors benign neglect 
and "color-blind" racial policies. 
Finally, on the cultural issues, a lib- 
eral is someone who favors cultural 
pluralism and is considered more 
tolerant of social disorder; a con- 
servative is someone who favors cul- 
tural orthodoxy and is more intol- 
erant of social disorder. 
In Table 1, I present the average 
liberal-conservative scores for each 
major constituency of the New Deal 
Coalition on well-known social wel- 
fare, foreign policy, civil rights, and 
cultural issues drawn from the 1988 
National Election Study (Erikson et 
al. 1988: Appendix).5 In the final 
column, I also present the inter- 
correlations between each policy issue 
and the Bush vote.6 While the tabu- 
lated data permit only a partial test 
of policy polarization, they demon- 
strate sharp issue differences among 
the constituent groups. In general, 
white southerners, white ethnics, and 
even labor union members, many of 
whom claim ethnic origins, tend to 
favor policies that are moderate to 
conservative in orientation; while lib- 
erals and blacks tend to hold much 
more liberal positions.7 The greatest 
disparities, not surprisingly, are over 
compensatory civil rights policies, 
especially the racially explosive issue 
of affirmative action. 
The challenge facing Dukakis and 
the Democrats in 1988 was to woo 
back into the presidential fold two 
key defecting groups from the New 
Deal Coalition-white southerners 
and white ethnics. Unfortunately, the 
Massachusetts governor's progressive 
positions on further extensions of the 
social welfare state (in the tradition 
of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Tru- 
man, and John Kennedy) and foreign 
policy did not count for much 
because the country was at peace and 
apparently prosperous. On the other 
hand, his positions on domestic 
spending, taxes, the defense budget, 
minority aid programs, affirmative 
action, and the crime issue were sim- 
ply too liberal for these two groups. 
Overall, the policy disagreements 
between Bush and Dukakis appear to 
have produced a moderate polariza- 
tion of the New Deal Coalition along 
conservative-liberal lines that worked 
to the advantage of the Republican 
candidate. 
In the voting literature, policy dis- 
putes are generally viewed as "hard" 
political issues (Carmines and Stimp- 
son 1980). From a cultural perspec- 
tive, they are primarily concerned not 
with how Americans feel toward the 
objects (i.e., beneficiaries) of gov- 
ernment action (the so-called "easy" 
issues) but how they feel toward the 
less completely understood instru- 
ments (i.e., programs) for carrying 
them out. Unfortunately, this useful 
distinction has been largely lost by 
the equivalent but more antiseptic 
social-psychological distinction be- 
tween "symbolic" and "cognitive" 
issues (Conover and Feldman 1981). 
(3) That the 1988 Democratic Con- 
TABLE 1. 
Liberal-Conservative Scores on Issue Domains, by New Deal Group 
New Deal Group 
White White 
Issue Domain Southerners Ethnics Labor Liberals Blacks Bush (r) 
Social Welfare 
Domestic Spending .02 -.07 -.09 -.23 -.32 .36 
Standard of Living .26 .16 .06 -.03 -.28 .34 
Foreign Policy 
Defense Spending .11 .03 -.04 -.24 -.15 .34 
Soviet Union .06 -.06 -.08 -.27 -.06 .15 
Civil Rights 
Aid to Minorities .31 .21 .16 -.10 -.35 .30 
Affirmative Action .66 .73 .69 .47 -.30 .23 
Cultural 
Legal Abortion -.10 -.26 -.23 -.40 -.10 .12 
Homosexual Rights .13 -.10 -.10 -.33 -.26 .18 
Women's Role -.42 -.51 -.52 -.65 -.47 .09 
School Prayer .03 -.14 -.13 -.27 -.00 .06 
Bush Percentage 60.6 53.0 40.7 17.1 8.0 
vention was an electoral and media 
disaster for the Democrats, compara- 
ble in effect to the 1968 and 1972 
debacles. 
Opinion polls show that Dukakis 
went from a 10 percent lead over 
Bush before the Democratic Conven- 
tion to a 10 percent disadvantage 
after the Republican Convention 
(Opinion Roundup 1988: 36-7).8 The 
final election day breakdown of 54 
percent for Bush to 46 percent for 
Dukakis thus represents a net shift of 
only two percentage points. 
It can be argued that the Demo- 
cratic Convention helped sow the 
seeds for Dukakis's defeat because it 
resurrected negative racial, ethnic, 
and cultural stereotypes for the two 
groups, white ethnics and white 
Southerners, whom the Dukakis- 
Bentsen team was supposedly de- 
signed, at least in theory, to attract. 
Stereotypic cues that may have 
negatively influenced these two 
groups include: 
*The crude, boastful, and often 
vulgar behavior of the Texas 
Democratic "Bush Bashers," 
whose language and demeanor 
was offensive not only to a large 
number of southern Bible Belt 
Christians but also to many south- 
erners who have historically taken 
pride in their soft-spoken dis- 
course and gracious manners 
(Reed 1974).9 The brash irrev- 
erance of the "Bush Bashers" 
may have also offended many 
white ethnics with strong religious 
ties to the Catholic and Orthodox 
faiths. 
* The attention lavished on Jesse 
Jackson, a controversial civil 
rights leader, by liberal Democrats 
and the media during the first 
three days of the convention. As a 
champion of the black race and 
an exponent of racial confronta- 
tion, Jackson infuriates many 
white southerners and northern 
white ethnics. He also epitomizes 
what they detest: a "pushy" black 
who enjoys status and respect. 
This hostility can be seen, for 
example, in the low thermometer 
ratings he received from these two 
groups in the 1988 National Elec- 
tion Study, the lowest received by 
any Democratic candidate for 
President. By comparison, Bush 
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received ratings that rivaled his 
popular predecessor (see Table 2). 
* The inadvertent communication of 
discordant and disturbing cultural 
images, such as Garrison Keillor's 
apology to school children for the 
lyrics in the Star Spangled Banner. 
Keillor said they really weren't 
"militaristic," a word that seems 
alien to the pro-defense attitudes 
of most white southerners (Joslyn 
1980). And what were convention 
viewers to make of the police and 
medical convoys that escorted the 
candidates to the convention hall 
through Atlanta's dark and 
deserted streets? Did many sub- 
liminally ask themselves how safe, 
secure, and civilized America 
would be under the Democrats? 
Finally, the musical celebration 
of Neil Diamond's "Coming to 
America," a paean to Ellis Island 
and the immigrant ethos, was cer- 
tainly a source of pride and recogni- 
tion for many white ethnics. How- 
ever, it may also have raised negative 
cultural stereotypes for many white 
southerners and urban ethnics who 
have become increasingly concerned 
about the rising numbers of non- 
white aliens that have entered the 
United States both legally and 
illegally. 
(4) That the Bush campaign was 
brilliantly conceived and superbly 
executed to exploit the racial-ethnic, 
religious, and cultural divisions in 
American society. 
The strategy employed three classic 
cultural appeals: (a) reference group 
identifications, (b) religious beliefs, 
and (c) cultural dominance. These 
appeals were designed to remind 
"mainline" northern whites, evan- 
gelical southern whites, northern 
white ethnics, and conservatives that 
Republicans are the party of white 
dominance, religious morality, cul- 
tural orthodoxy, and social order. 
This strategy was made possible by 
proclaiming the successes of the 
Reagan-Bush economic recovery (the 
25 percent tax cut, the 50 percent 
reduction in inflation, the cutting of 
interest rates from 21 to 10 percent, 
and the creation of 17 million new 
jobs) and the defense buildup, there- 
by neutralizing if not appropriating 
the prosperity and peace issues. 
The cultural appeals employed 
subtle codewords and visual images 
TABLE 2. 
Candidate Thermometer Ratings, by New Deal Group 
New Deal Group 
Thermometer White White 
Ratings Southerners Ethnics Labor Liberals Blacks 
Reagan 69 63 56 45 37 
Bush 66 62 57 46 46 
Dukakis 54 55 60 67 69 
Jackson 42 42 51 60 80 
that protected Bush and the Repub- 
licans from charges of racism and 
demagoguery. These included pinning 
the "liberal" tail on the Democratic 
donkey; making Willie Horton a 
household word; portraying Dukakis 
as the "greasy Greek" who let Hor- 
ton go; and depicting Bush as the 
defender and champion of God, 
country, motherhood, and the Amer- 
ican way of life. 10 Bush's strong 
stands on the pledge of allegiance, 
abortion, the ACLU, traditional 
values, and pragmatic anti-commu- 
nism (peace through strength), as 
well as campaign pictures of him 
decked out in an Air Force flight 
jacket, also helped undermine and 
discredit the so-called "wimp" issue. 
But how effective were the cultural 
appeals of the Bush campaign? Per- 
haps the most reliable source of data 
for assessing this issue is the 1988 
American National Election Study. 
Unfortunately, the NES surveys, as 
currently structured, do not provide 
much useful information on the 
influence of religious beliefs (Leege 
et al. 1989). They do, however, pro- 
vide a great deal of information on 
the effects of reference group feelings 
and some suggestive data on the 
political struggle in American politics 
for cultural dominance. 
To estimate the influence of ref- 
erence group feelings, I correlated 
the feeling thermometer ratings of 
selected groups in the 1988 NES with 
the Bush vote. Table 3 presents the 
intercorrelations for the entire na- 
tion as well as eight regional sub- 
samples. " The reference groups are 
ranked in descending order of their 
national intercorrelations with the 
Bush vote. Those groups with signifi- 
cant positive correlations are classi- 
fied as "positive" reference groups, 
those with very low positive to very 
low negative correlations are denoted 
as "neutral" reference groups, and 
those with significant negative corre- 
lations are designated as "negative" 
reference groups.12 
Nationally, as well as regionally, it 
is possible to see the potency of the 
conservative and liberal labels in the 
1988 presidential election. As noted 
above, Bush worked assiduously to 
pin the liberal label on Dukakis, and 
based on the tabulated results, the 
strategy appears to have worked. 
Another strategy that bore fruit for 
the Republican candidate was his 
"negative" campaign. Thus, his vote 
seems to have been shaped more by 
voter attitudes toward "negative" 
than toward "positive" reference 
groups. These negative reference 
groups include welfare recipients, 
illegal aliens, gays and lesbians, 
blacks, feminists, labor unions, and 
civil rights leaders. All, of course, 
can be lumped under the liberal 
label. 
The results of Table 3 also demon- 
strate a central thesis of subcultural 
theories (Elazar 1984), namely, that 
cultural conflicts are regionally spe- 
cific. Thus, for Bush voters in the 
Pacific states, big business represents 
an important reference group; while 
civil rights leaders and gays and les- 
bians constitute critical negative ref- 
erence groups. Similarly, feminists 
represent a critical negative reference 
group in the Rocky Mountain states, 
which encompass the traditional- 
family-oriented Mormon cultural 
region. 13 As expected, blacks and 
civil rights leaders (like Jesse Jack- 
son) are the political pariahs of Bush 
supporters in the Border and Deep 
South. In the Great Lakes states, the 
so-called foundry of the nation, 
labor unions constitute the most 
important negative reference group 
among Bush supporters. In the Mid- 
Atlantic states, civil rights leaders 
and Hispanics are viewed as the two 
most important cultural adversaries; 
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TABLE 3. 
Intercorrelations of 1988 Bush Vote and Reference Group Thermometer Ratings, by State Grouping 
State Grouping 
Border 
Reference Groups U.S. New England Mid-Atlantic Great Lakes South Deep South Great Plains Rocky Mountain Pacific 
Positive 
Conservatives .39* .41* .47* .29* .41* .39* .30* .27* .46* 
Big Business .19* -.04 .33* .08 .09 .11 .26* .15 .35* 
Federal Government .17* .13 .17* .14* .07 .21* .15 .22 .26* 
Military .14* .05 .05 .06 .06 .04 .14 -.11 .25* 
Antiabortionists .11* -.06 .06 .17* .05 .05 .20* .34* .17* 
Neutral 
Supreme Court .07* .02 .20* .00 -.04 -.10 .15 .18 .22* 
Fundamentalists .07* -.06 -.02 .02 .06 .10 .05 .14 .19* 
Political Evangelicals .06* -.19 .02 .07 -.01 -.01 .14 .37* .18* 
Whites .04 .08 .17* .00 -.05 .01 .03 -.33* .15* 
Jews -.03 -.10 .01 -.04 .02 -.16* .06 -.09 .03 
Catholics -.04 -.10 .00 -.22* -.02 -.10 .08 -.20 .13* 
Women -.06* -.07 .08 -.16* 9 -.19 -.04 -.10 .02 .02 
Congress -.07* -.15 .10 -.16* -.03 -.05 -.11 -.07 -.10 
Elderly -.10* .04 .04 -.16* -.09 -.19* .10 -.31* -.14* 
Negative 
Environmentalists -.14* -.22* .04 -.14* -.16* -.21* -.03 -.22 -.24* 
Palestinians -.14* -.33* -.10 -.09 -.24* -.17* -.10 .20 -.19* 
Hispanics -.16* -.30* -.43* -.09 -.23* -.28* -.01 -.21 -.15' 
Poor -.18* -.21* -.17* -.22* -.16* -.28* -.08 -.20 -.09 
Welfare -.19* -.37* -.28* -.9 - .11 -.16* .02 -.16 -.24* 
Illegal Aliens -.19* -.34* -.36* -.12* -.13 -.24* -.10 -.05 -.19* 
Gays and Lesbians -.22* -.16 -.31* -.17* -.14 -.26* -.21* -.07 -.34* 
Blacks -.24* -.24* -.26* -.23* -.35* -.39* -.04 -.04 -.16* 
Feminists -.30* -.18 -.36* -.31* -.29* -.34* -.28* -.41* -.23* 
Labor Unions -.33* -.28* -.28* -.40* -.31* -.37* -.35* -.26 -.27* 
Civil Rights Leaders -.37* -.41* -.40* -.30* -.37* -.54* -.23* -.24 -.32* 
Liberals -.39* -.38* -.14* -.34* -.48* -.35* -.42* -.32* -.40* 
*p < .05 
while in New England they are wel- 
fare recipients, and once again, civil 
rights leaders. 
Finally, it is clear from a compari- 
son of the correlation coefficients in 
Tables 1 and 3 that if political ref- 
erence groups are interpreted as the 
cultural "objects" of public policy, 
then at the national level cultural 
(symbolic) issues were at least as 
important as the so-called rational 
(cognitive) issues in structuring the 
presidential vote. At the disaggre- 
gated regional level, of course, cul- 
tural reference group theory appears 
to provide a superior predictive 
model to rational voting theory. 
To estimate the impact of the cul- 
tural dominance issue in the 1988 
campaign, it is necessary to make the 
following assumptions. According to 
cultural theory, racial origin and eth- 
nic ancestry are the fountainheads of 
subcultural differences. Given this 
premise, it follows that in culturally 
pluralistic societies, electoral politics 
is, among other things, the struggle 
for racial and ethnic dominance. If 
this thesis is true, then there should 
be a strong correlation between a 
ranking of the culturally dominant 
and subordinate groups in American 
society, on the one hand, and the 
presidential vote on the other. 
Table 4 presents the results of 
crosstabulating the 1988 Bush vote 
with one hypothesized cultural peck- 
ing order. In this scheme, all respon- 
dents were classified into six major 
cultural groups on the basis of their 
responses to the ethnic ancestry ques- 
tion. In the presumed order of their 
cultural dominance, the six groups 
include mainline, American, ethnic, 
Asian, New World, and African. 14 
As predicted by dominance theory, 
the results show that support for 
Bush was strong among currently 
ascendant groups in the cultural spec- 
trum, i.e., mainline, American, eth- 
nic, and Asian voters, but that it 
tapered off sharply among New 
World and African voters. 
(5) That the dominant cleavages in 
the 1988 presidential election were 
not socioeconomic, but cultural; i.e., 
divisions based on race-ethnicity, 
religion, and regional culture. 
Support for this contention is 
readily available in the form of 
national exit poll results and state-by- 
state aggregate election returns. For 
instance, exit poll results from the 
New York Times/CBS News Poll 
(1988: 17) show that: 
* 59 percent of whites voted for 
Bush while 86 percent of blacks 
voted for Dukakis; 
* 81 percent of white fundamental- 
ist or evangelical Christians, 66 
percent of Protestants, and 52 
percent of Catholics went for 
Bush; while 64 percent of Jews 
went for Dukakis; and 
* 67 percent of whites in the 
South, the most Democratic 
region of the country, voted for 
Bush. 
By comparison, class divisions are 
not nearly as pronounced. Thus, 
there is not much difference in the 
levels of reported support for Bush 
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among lower-middle ($12,500- 
$24,999), middle ($25,000-$34,999) 
and upper-middle ($35,000-$49,999) 
income families. The 20 percent of 
all voters who fell into the lower- 
middle group divided about evenly 
between Bush and Dukakis while the 
40 percent of all voters who fell into 
the middle and upper-middle groups 
provided only a six percent margin 
for Bush. The only income groups 
exhibiting clear partisan preferences 
are the poor (under $12,000) and the 
rich (over $50,000). Both divide in a 
62 to 37 percent ratio, with the poor, 
of course, tilting to Dukakis and the 
rich to Bush. 
Aggregate state results, in turn, 
suggest that Bush enjoyed a solid, 
almost impregnable base of electoral 
support in the South, the Great 
Plains, and the Rocky Mountains. 
Collectively these states provide 204 
of the 270 electoral votes needed to 
win the presidency, a virtual "lock" 
by most standards. In addition, he 
won support from states that were 
populated, in varying degrees, by 
southern settlers. These include the 
border states of Kentucky, Missouri, 
and Oklahoma with 28 electoral 
votes plus the lower Midwestern 
states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois 
with an additional 59 electoral votes. 
By comparison, the only states 
that Dukakis carried are "northern" 
states which: 
* have predominantly nonwhite 
populations (Hawaii and the Dis- 
trict of Columbia); 
* are strongly Democratic at the 
state level (Rhode Island, Massa- 
chusetts, New York, and West 
Virginia); or 
* are known for their predominantly 
white and culturally homogeneous 
populations, "moralistic" sub- 
cultures, and "progressive" poli- 
tics (Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Oregon, Washington, and Iowa). 
Perhaps a more definitive test of 
this contention, however, is provided 
by individual level data drawn from 
the 1988 NES study. Table 5 presents 
the results of correlating the 1988 
Bush vote with five selected variables 
for the entire national sample and 
eight regional subsamples. The vari- 
ables include measures of racial 
origin, ethnic ancestry, Protestant 
church membership, family income, 
and Republican party identification. 
From a cultural perspective, the 
party identification variable may be 
construed as a supra-cultural variable 
that reflects individual differences in 
racial-ethnic background, religious 
affiliation, social structure, and 
regional subculture. And since it is so 
close to the actual vote decision, it 
appears to represent an overall pro- 
pensity to vote for the endorsed can- 
didate of one party over the other. 
Therefore, if we set aside (ignore) 
the results for party identification, 
the tabulated data clearly show that 
the 1988 presidential vote was struc- 
tured more in each region (and 
nationally) by cultural (i.e., racial, 
ethnic, or religious) than socio- 
economic (i.e., family income) dif- 
ferences. In addition, it is clear that 
the distribution of the vote depends 
on the cultural mix in each region. 
Thus, race becomes an important 
cleavage in the vote wherever blacks 
are found in significant numbers, 
namely the Mid-Atlantic, Great 
TABLE 4. 
Breakdown of the 1988 Presidential N 
Lakes, Border South, Deep South, 
and Pacific (largely limited to Cali- 
fornia) regions. Ethnic cleavages, in 
turn, are most pronounced in the 
New England region, but largely dis- 
appear elsewhere except in the racial- 
ly divided Border South where a sig- 
nificant number of ethnic whites 
apparently joined forces with main- 
line groups. Religious divisions, by 
comparison, are most pronounced in 
the Great Plains and Rocky Moun- 
tain regions. Finally, the results of 
Table 5 suggest that race and social 
class are, to some extent, coalescing 
cleavages in American politics. And 
this may help account for some of 
the apparent differences in scholarly 
explanations of modern presidential 
elections (Carmines and Stimson 
1989; Erikson 1988). 
I rest my case. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have offered a 
serious and systematic explanation 
Vote, by Racial and Ethnic Ancestry 
Racial and Ethnic Ancestry 
Vote Mainline American Ethnic Asian New World African 
% % o% % %o % 
Bush 62.7 59.3 53.0 54.5 31.0 6.1 
Dukakis 36.0 40.3 45.5 45.5 69.0 90.8 
Other 1.2 0.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 3.1 
TABLE 5. 
Intercorrelations of 1988 Bush Vote with Selected Variables, 
by Nation and State Cultural Groupings 
Selected Variables 
Aggregation Level N Whitea Ethicb Protestantc Incomed Repub.e 
United States 1209 .32* .01 .13* .19* .56* 
State Grouping 
New England 70 .09 -.27 .19 -.03 .60* 
Mid-Atlantic 179 .28* .04 .11 .23* .45* 
Great Lakes 238 .37* -.04 .12* .28* .59* 
Border South 141 .44* .18* -.05 .28* .55* 
Deep South 204 .42* .06 .14* .19* .52* 
Great Plains 112 .14 -.01 .27* .07 .57* 
Mountain 47 .17 -.10 .33* .17 .64* 
Pacific 218 .26* -.00 .20* .14* .62* 
*p < .05 
aCoded as 1 for white respondents and 0 for nonwhite respondents. 
bCoded as I for all respondents who reported a "white ethnic" ancestry and 0 for everyone else. 
CCoded as 1 for all respondents who said they were Protestant and 0 for everyone else. 
dMeasured by a respondent's estimated family income. 
'Coded as 1 for all Republican identifiers and 0 for everyone else. 
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for the Bush win in 1988. In particu- 
lar, I have argued that there is an 
underlying logic and dynamic to 
modern presidential elections which 
is primarily, but not exclusively, cul- 
tural. Thus, Republican candidates 
have won more often in recent elec- 
tions because they are more success- 
ful in appealing to the cultural pref- 
erences and prejudices of American 
voters. According to this perspective, 
the broadcast and printed media 
should be viewed not as the king- 
makers, but as the handmaidens of 
American politics. Finally, this logic 
may help explain not only the out- 
comes of presidential general elec- 
tions but also the outcomes of presi- 
dential primaries. Perhaps the most 
interesting development in the 1988 
campaign was the extent to which the 
major contenders in each party were 
dependent on culturally and region- 
ally distinctive coalitions of political 
supporters. 15 
My final contention is simple and 
direct. If this interpretation of the 
1988 presidential campaign and elec- 
tion is correct, then it follows that 
future Democratic presidential candi- 
dates who ignore the cultural realities 
of American politics do so at their 
electoral peril. 
Notes 
1. Bob Erikson (1989: 30), for instance, 
has mischievously argued that "it must be in 
the Democrats' electoral interest to lose presi- 
dential elections." In his first retrospective 
assessment, Lee Sigelman (1989: 38) wag- 
gishly attributes the outcome of the presiden- 
tial primaries to momentum and "the con- 
stantly shifting and largely unforeseeable for- 
tunes of the campaign"; in his second, he 
(Sigelman 1990) sardonically concludes that 
"Democrats are too stupid to calculate their 
self-interest" and Democratic presidential 
candidates are too ugly to win. 
2. Perhaps one unobtrusive measure of 
this trend is the large number of parents in 
the 1980s (Williams 1990: 17) who chose 
names for their children "that reflected their 
heritage, ethnic origin and economic status." 
3. Based on the 1988 National Election 
Study, about 71 percent of all self-identified 
"mainline" respondents reported voting as 
opposed to 64 percent of all self-identified 
"white ethnic" respondents, 55 percent of all 
self-identified "Asian-American" respon- 
dents, 46 percent of all self-identified "New 
World" respondents, 52 percent of all self- 
identified "African-American" respondents, 
and 49 percent of all self-identified "Ameri- 
can" respondents. For definitional purposes, 
"mainline" respondents include those who 
reported British, German, and Scandinavian 
ancestries as well as those who indicated 
Anglo-Canadian, Netherlander, Hollander, 
Dutch, Australian, New Zealander, Tas- 
manian, Protestant, and Mormon ancestries. 
"White ethnics" include all respondents who 
reported Irish, Eastern Europe, Mediter- 
ranean, and Balkan ancestries as well as those 
who indicated French-Canadian, Austrian, 
Belgian, French, Luxembourg, Swiss, West- 
ern European, European, white, Caucasian, 
Catholic, and Jewish ancestries. "African- 
Americans" include all respondents who 
reported black, Negro, American black, and 
Afro-American ancestries as well as those 
who said their forebears were from any Afri- 
can country except Egypt and South Africa. 
"New World" respondents include all those 
who reported American Indian, Mexican, 
Mexican-American, Central-American, West 
Indian, South American, Chicano, and His- 
panic ancestries as well as those who indi- 
cated tribal affiliations. Finally, "American" 
respondents include all respondents who 
refused to report an ethnic ancestry other 
than American. 
4. Social welfare issues appear to have 
declined because of the institutionalization of 
the social welfare state. In modern presiden- 
tial elections this fact is reflected in the 
declining importance of social class as a 
voting cleavage. Foreign policy issues, of 
course, are generally esoteric (with the 
notable exception of defense spending and 
divisive conflicts such as the Vietnam War) 
and therefore do not generate strong policy 
preferences among most voters. 
5. The liberal-conservative scores were 
estimated by computing the group averages 
of standardized scores. These standardized 
scores vary between - 1 (an extremely liberal 
response) and + 1 (an extremely conservative 
response). They were obtained by subtracting 
the midpoint score from the actual value and 
then dividing by one-half of the range. 
6. The "Bush vote" was measured by a 
dichotomous variable that took on the values 
of 1 (voted for Bush) and 0 (did not vote for 
Bush) based on responses to the question: 
"Who did you vote for?" 
7. On three of the four "cultural" issues 
in Table 1, blacks are virtually indistinguish- 
able from white southerners and white eth- 
nics. The uniformly liberal positions of all 
New Deal groups on the role of women are 
hardly surprising, given the loaded question 
wording of this item in the 1988 National 
Election Study. 
8. Polls suggest Dukakis' lead temporarily 
increased to 17 percent in the brief afterglow 
of the convention. But this lead seems to have 
been ephemeral and quickly evaporated. 
9. Though Texas was a part of the Old 
Confederacy, its political culture is quite dif- 
ferent. As Neal Peirce and Jerry Hagstrom 
(1984: 618) observe, Texas has always been 
considered the big, brawling braggart in the 
family of American states, one which 
"inspires love and hate." In his insightful 
delineation of cultural regions in the U.S., 
Gastil (1975) divides the South into four dif- 
ferent subregions: the Lowland South, the 
Upland South, the Mountain South, and 
finally, the Western South, which includes 
primarily Texas and Oklahoma. 
10. These messages and images were com- 
municated not only in paid television and 
radio ads but also in special election bro- 
chures circulated to millions of voters by 
state Republican party organizations. An 
Ohio edition juxtaposed on its front cover a 
smiling, all-American pose of Bush in a con- 
servative dark blue suit with a supercilious 
snapshot of Dukakis in a garish pinstripe 
suit. Smaller prints of these pictures were 
laced throughout the brochure to provide 
visual reminders of the candidates when 
voters read their respective issue positions. 
Inside the cover, readers were introduced to a 
mug shot of a sullen-looking Horton, in- 
formed of his conviction and sentence to life 
in prison "WITHOUT PAROLE" for first 
degree murder in the stabbing of a 17-year- 
old boy during a robbery, alerted to 
Dukakis's role in paroling him under Massa- 
chusetts's "recreational weekend furlough" 
program, and then provided a blow-by-blow 
description of his brutalization of a young 
Maryland couple that culminated in the 
repeated rape of the young man's fiancee at 
knife point. On the next page readers are 
informed of the unsavory records of Massa- 
chusetts' prisoners released under the fur- 
lough program and then asked to compare 
the positions of the two candidates on the 
death penalty and mandatory sentencing as 
well as the political endorsements they 
received (police patrolmen associations for 
Bush, the ACLU for Dukakis). On subse- 
quent pages, readers are informed about 
Massachusetts's high levels of taxation and 
spending under Dukakis, the state's present 
budget difficulties, Dukakis's positions on a 
number of defense issues that would allegedly 
insure "a weaker America" (next to a picture 
of a tall, dominant Bush looking down and 
shaking hands with a diminutive, docile Gor- 
bachev), and the stands of the two candidates 
on education, the environment, and family 
values. Finally, on the back cover, readers 
are treated to a firm-and-resolute, full-page 
pose of Bush in a macho Air Force flight 
jacket. 
11. The New England region includes the 
states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Ver- 
mont; the Mid-Atlantic region includes the 
states of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Maryland plus the District 
of Columbia; the Great Lakes region includes 
the states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin; the Border South 
region includes the states of Kentucky, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ten- 
nessee, Virginia, and West Virginia; the Deep 
South region includes the states of Alabama, 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas; the 
Great Plains region includes the states of 
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota; the Mountain 
region includes the states of Arizona, Colo- 
rado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Utah, and Wyoming; and the Pacific region 
includes the states of Alaska, California, 
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. 
12. This classification scheme assumes that 
what matters is not the average magnitude of 
a group's thermometer ating (which only 
establishes a benchmark score) but the extent 
to which attitudes toward a group provide a 
basis for partisan differentiation. 
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13. Across from Temple Square in the 
heart of Salt Lake City, the Mormons have 
erected a bronze statuary of a Mormon 
father, mother, and son. The son is eagerly 
running from the loving arms of his kneeling 
mother to the expectant arms of his standing 
father. On the base of the pedestal is an 
inscription that reads: "The nation is only 
as strong as the family." 
14. The nationalities that comprise each 
group are identified in note 3. A seventh 
group, "Middle-Eastern," was found to 
include no respondents of middle-eastern 
ancestry who voted. 
15. In the Democratic primaries, for in- 
stance, Jesse Jackson was the overwhelming 
favorite among black voters and generally did 
best in states with large black populations. 
Michael Dukakis was the preferred choice 
among urban, liberal, and Jewish voters and 
was usually the vote leader in states with sig- 
nificant concentrations of these groups. Final- 
ly, Missouri's Richard Gephardt and Ten- 
nessee's Albert Gore were largely regional, 
"favorite-son" candidates and did best in 
those states that were in close proximity to 
their home states. In the Republican pri- 
maries, Pat Robertson had a very narrow 
base among evangelical Christians and did 
well in those states where their intensity of 
support (the Iowa caucuses) or concentration 
was evident. Kansas's Bob Dole, a favorite 
son of the agrarian heartland, did well in the 
neighboring midwestern farm state of Iowa, 
but could not do much elsewhere. Bush, by 
comparison, seemed to attract broad-based 
support from traditional Republican groups, 
such as white mainline Protestants in the 
North, and white Protestants of British 
ancestry who have been defecting from the 
Democratic Party in the South. 
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